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Patent as credit
When intellectual property becomes speculative
hyo yoon Kang
Intellectual properties, the various kinds of which are 
known as patents, copyright and trademarks, could 
be regarded as central techniques of accumulation in 
contemporary capitalism, if immaterial knowledge is 
indeed what now crucially drives accumulation in a 
‘knowledge economy’ or ‘creative industries’.1 In such 
a process of value generation and accumulation, it is 
precisely the law of intellectual property that allows 
certain kinds of knowledge to be repackaged and 
transformed into units of appropriation, transfer and 
commodification. But how exactly does this process 
occur? 
The conversion of knowledge into an object of 
property right, sometimes also portrayed as forming 
part of an ‘intellectual commons’, requires several 
steps of legal abstraction and socio-economic associa-
tions to make it into something that is believed to 
be of value, to be desired and accumulated. It would 
not therefore be accurate to talk of a straightforward 
appropriation of creativity, knowledge or inventions 
through intellectual property law. It is not possible 
to patent common knowledge, creativity or tradition. 
But if these can be incorporated and transformed 
into particular techno-scientific singularities, then 
the patent law can transmute them into market com-
modities. What can be legally appropriated is not, for 
example, ‘common sense’ or the discovery of chewing 
peppermint for fresh breath, but a specific form and 
material embodiment of that knowledge and usage. 
The discovery of peppermint leaves could not be 
patented, but the molecular forms of the peppermint 
essence and its synthetic chemical copies, which can 
then be used (in legal parlance, ‘materially embod-
ied’) in chewing gums and pastilles, would count as 
patentable inventions.2 Legal doctrines and techni-
calities make that transformation from a ‘common 
sense’ invention into a proprietary invention possible. 
That is why the internal legal mechanisms deserve 
better scrutiny. 
Critical accounts of intellectual property 
regimes often conflate these different senses of 
what constitutes an obvious invention or common 
knowledge in contrast to a patentable invention or 
copyrightable original work. However, their strengths 
are in witnessing the anomalies and injustices caused 
by the patent system, concerning such issues as bio-
piracy and access to knowledge.3 They also include 
analyses of the international political economy of 
intellectual property, which is inequitably skewed 
by disproportionately pushing singular national and 
commercial interests at the expense of others.4 These 
accounts can be characterized as critiques of the 
social effects of intellectual property law; they are 
necessary and valuable. But my analytical focus here 
is different. In this article I want to understand why 
intellectual property is being pushed so strongly as 
‘rights’ by certain interests, and what makes it valu-
able, particularly when so many of the patents turn 
out to be useless. The obvious simplistic answer to 
the question is that intellectual property rights are 
akin to property rights in things that can be owned, 
traded and enforced. They are commodities and that 
is what makes them valuable. However, I suspect that 
the more complete answer lies in the exact mecha-
nisms of intellectual property valorization because 
the value of intangible properties relates to processes 
of their materialization, perhaps much more so than 
in the case of real property, such as land. A different 
kind of critique needs to include a better explana-
tion of the linkage of intangible properties to the 
process of accumulation and capitalization within 
the so-called ‘knowledge economy’ through abstract 
quantification and material market practices. 
A good number of mainly quantitative analy-
ses of intellectual property rights (particularly of 
patents) exist in mainstream economics and law 
and economics scholarship, as well as in economic 
history. They mainly examine the effect of patent 
monopolies on venture capital financing, knowledge 
diffusion, rate of innovation and competition.5 The 
more quantitative analyses also include studies on 
patent pricing and on the modelling of their value for 
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the overall economy based on different yardsticks of 
measurement.6 One common characteristic uniting 
mainstream law and economics scholars and some 
of the most trenchant critics of intellectual property 
is that they seem to understand law with a capital ‘L’: 
law is portrayed as a given factum and blackboxed as 
something immutable. In contrast, there is a dearth 
of critical and nuanced analyses of the ways in which 
intellectual properties become integrated into the 
neoliberal capitalist ‘knowledge economy’ – which 
is surprising in light of the sustained discussion 
elsewhere of the notions of immaterial labour and 
cognitive economy.7 In the context of universities, 
Gert Raunig has offered a methodical analysis of 
the meaning of creativity and education within the 
cognitive economy and the logical consequences for 
any eventual space of critical action.8 To the best 
of my knowledge, we lack a comparable analysis of 
intellectual properties as highly specific legal forms 
within the cognitive and financialized economy. A 
careful analysis of intellectual properties requires a 
precise understanding of the legal narrative forms 
(in the context of patent law they are: invention, 
novelty, utility and inventiveness) and the mundane 
technicalities (timing of filing, administrative pro-
cedures, documentary workflow and classification, 
litigation strategies) because it is through these 
everyday practices that works, inventions and signs 
are stabilized into economic and financial commodi-
ties rather than through high-profile court cases. 
Also, beyond specific topical settings, such an analysis 
would need to elucidate the more general processes 
by which these divergent intangible properties are 
attached to and transformed into capital relations. 
So when it is claimed that intellectual properties are 
the key drivers of current capital accumulation in 
the post-industrial ‘knowledge economy’, the follow-
ing elements need to be unpacked in order to grasp 
relations between law and economy: the internal 
legal self-understanding of intellectual property as 
an economic unit, its abstraction into measurable, 
quantitative value, as well as the material practices 
enabling and stabilizing such an abstraction. The 
value of intangible property is measured, and there 
are different ways of producing such measures. It is 
worth finding out more about these. This means that 
we need to look into financial accounting principles 
as well as the material valuation practices through 
which economic and financial value is attached to 
intellectual property.9 
This article offers a brief overview of a larger project 
in which I study the different material and semantic 
practices that define and give rise to a patent’s value. 
I am interested in how patents are accounted for 
and how they are valued as economic units. What is 
a patent worth? And what drives its value? Patents 
are interesting legal forms, in that they embody a 
double abstraction: the abstraction of knowledge 
into a legal property object and the abstraction of 
such property objects into calculable exchangeable 
commodities. Here I present three various operative 
modes of patents: patents as property in the inventive 
labour model; patents as currency of credence; and 
patents as investment assets or as securities. Intel-
lectual property rights, as with ‘real’ property rights, 
are never absolute, and what makes their study so 
interesting is seeing how they acquire their various 
values and what kind of links and associations can 
make property rights more or less solid or unstable. 
The traditional patent labour model 
One source of the stability of the patent regime, 
which grants twenty years’ monopoly for an inven-
tion, has been the labour theory of value, which 
has served as the dominant justification of patent 
rights, at least in the modern patent system. It claims 
that inventive labour should be rewarded, and that 
such rewards would encourage the production of 
more inventions. This may include invention in 
application-driven technological fields, as well as in 
more cerebral academic sciences. Interestingly, the 
scientific or academic economy of credit and the 
traditional patent law justification narrative of inven-
tive labour mesh well with one another. It is worth 
revisiting some of the explanations of science as an 
economy itself. 
Bourdieu characterized academic science as a 
system of symbolic and real capital accumulation and 
investment in which the value of the capital is deter-
mined by the definition and constant realization of 
the very market by scientists themselves.10 Whereas 
Bourdieu emphasized the accumulation of credit as 
the main driving force of academic science, Latour 
and Woolgar went further with their characterization 
of scientific activity as a capitalistic circulation of 
credit.11 In their account, scientists do not only seek 
credits as rewards in order to accumulate surplus and 
increase their overall stock of intellectual capital; 
intellectual and monetary capital accumulations go 
hand in hand because of the circular nature of the 
credit economy in which it is imperative that the 
surplus credit is reinvested in the means of produc-
tion in order to produce more knowledge. In such a 
conception, knowledge production is the very return 
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on investment. Latour and Woolgar compare scien-
tists to corporations and their CVs to balance sheets 
of all investments to date. Scientific credit does not 
only form a reward for past achievement but, cru-
cially, lends credibility in their ability to do well in 
the future, sending out the message: ‘I am not risky! 
I am a worthy investment!’ Credit and credibility 
come to be equivalent to reward and recognition in 
the form of more funding to produce more research, 
or in the form of patents which are useful for attract-
ing further funding, grants, equipment, workers for 
research or production. These, in turn, in an ideal 
scenario, produce more data, arguments, articles, 
recognition, credit, more investments, more returns, 
and so on. As Latour and Woolgar put it: 
it would be wrong to regard the receipt of reward 
as the ultimate objective of scientific activity. In 
fact, the receipt of reward is just one small portion 
of a large cycle of credibility investment. The es-
sential feature of this cycle is the gain of credibility 
which enables reinvestment and the further gain 
of credibility. Consequently, there is no ultimate 
objective to scientific investment other than the 
continual redeployment of accumulated resources. 
It is in this sense that we liken scientists’ credibil-
ity to a cycle of capital investment. … Credibility … 
concerns scientists’ abilities actually to do science. 
… The notion of credibility can thus apply both to 
the very substance of scientific production (facts) 
and to the influence of external factors, such as 
money and institutions.12
Woolgar and Latour argue that the objective of 
science’s credit circulation is to speed up the cycle 
of information production as a whole, based on the 
ability of the scientists to produce as much credible 
facts as fast and intensely as possible: ‘The relation-
ship between scientists is more like that between 
small corporations than that between a grocer and 
his customer. Corporations measure their success 
by looking at the growth of their operations and the 
intensity of the circulation of capital.’13 On this view, 
scientific activity is as fast and intense as the virtual 
marketplace of speculative capitalism.14 What is at 
stake is not the commodity or its consumption, but 
the mobility of investment and capital. 
Latour and Woolgar’s analysis was prescient 
concerning the way today’s scientific credits have 
become increasingly dependent on the general ability 
to attract funding for large-scale international pro-
jects and the vicious or virtuous cycle of academic 
and scientific evaluations as a mode of specific forms 
of knowledge production. But the question still 
remains: how does credibility accrue? Who evaluates 
who or what is credible? Traditionally, academics 
have performed mutual evaluations of credibility.15 
Now patents also perform the evaluative function 
of accreditation by signalling credibility and invest-
ability, especially with regard to scientific inventions 
which take a long time to develop, by granting the 
option to exercise monopoly rights over an invention 
when necessary. 
What does such an accreditation process entail? 
Patent examiners evaluate the invention according 
to patent law criteria (novelty, industrial application, 
inventive step) rather than explicitly dealing with 
questions of scientific credit in terms of recognition 
or reputation. What is important at this point is that 
patent law juxtaposes or adds legal credibility to 
scientific credit: the scientific author and the inventor 
exist side by side. There is no transformation taking 
place, but rather an addition: patent law evaluates the 
inventiveness of the object of property right, without 
necessarily engaging in exercises of scientific verifica-
tion. Crucially, this means that legal accreditation of 
credibility does not invalidate the scientific economy 
of credit, but operates adjacent to it. Patent law acts 
as another genre of credit.16
So far it looks as if scientific credit is the currency 
of the knowledge economy, whereas a patent is, at 
least from the ex post facto point of view of patent 
law doctrine, the legal reward for such inventive 
intellectual labour expended. But this labour theory 
of value, which underlies the main justification for 
patent law, serves as a poor and extremely mislead-
ing explanation for the process by which a patent is 
credited with value. The Lockean precept of modern 
patent law rationale is well known: a patent right is 
meant to reward inventions, which have been made 
by mixing ‘labour’ with ‘nature’, and such rewards 
will encourage more inventive activity, which will 
benefit the public. This labour theory of value narra-
tive in patent law, however, is incongruent with the 
differentiation between inventor and patentee. The 
inventor is named, but if the invention was devised 
in an employment relationship the patent right goes 
to the employer.17 The patentee, according to patent 
law, would not need to have expended a single minute 
of labour. Hence there are separate attributions of 
inventorship (to inventor) and ownership (to paten-
tee). Accordingly, it makes more sense to understand 
patent law not as rewarding inventive labour, but 
rather as providing capital and encouraging further 
investment for producing more inventions. 
Perhaps even more so than in the context of prop-
erty of land, the property rights of the patent holder 
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are justified on the grounds that the inventive activity 
is a process which takes much investment of time, 
money and labour rather than the product of the 
‘pure’ labour of an inventive genius. Seen from such 
a perspective, a patent right seems like a reward for 
acting despite the inherent uncertainty of scientific 
experiments and expending time, labour and money. 
Patents are portrayed as a high reward for a high risk 
taken. This is also the argument of biotechnologi-
cal and pharmaceutical companies, which empha-
size the risky nature of research and development 
investments that may lead to no profitable product. 
Leaving the question of the economic merits of these 
arguments to one side, I wish here to question the 
process by which the characterization of inventive 
activity as an investment has acquired such a level 
of taken-for-grantedness. The de facto prioritization 
of investment over labour not only highlights the 
inappropriateness of the Lockean labour theory of 
value underlying the justification of modern patent 
law, but also significantly obfuscates the importance 
of diverse fundings and investments in the making of 
an invention. These can be of a financial nature, such 
as loans, capital raising, grants and funding, endow-
ments and gifts. But investments can also denote 
the transmission of non-financial or non-monetary 
knowledges, or know-hows: works of predecessors 
in one’s technical field, years of education, passed-
down and acquired skills, technical facility, and so 
on. These kinds of investment are not considered 
when assessing a patent application. 
The patentee is seldom identical with the inven-
tors, the latter being mostly waged employees, who 
are nowadays lucky to be named at all, as they form 
parts of long global chains of production in which 
scientific labourers are separated into different cat-
egories with significantly differing rights and degrees 
of precariousness.18 Maurizio Lazzarato had written 
that ‘immaterial labor produces first and foremost 
a social relation – it produces not only commodi-
ties, but also the capital relation.’19 This observation 
is mirrored in Edelman’s depiction of the subject 
of ‘creative process’ in film copyright: ‘the effective 
subject in the ‘creative process’ is ultimately vested in 
the producer, property right through the creative act 
is secured in the interest of the capital advanced. … 
The product, property by right of creative subjective 
activity, remains with the true productive power, 
capital.’20 Patent law attributes intellectual prop-
erty ownership to the patentee, as inventive labour 
becomes secondary for the determination of patent 
ownership. It thereby gives rise to the subject of the 
patentee as the investor and producer of knowledge 
to whom interest – in the form of the patent right – is 
owed. As Hardt and Negri write, ‘it is not sufficient to 
pose the economic structure of labour as the source 
of a cultural superstructure of value; this notion 
of base and superstructure must be overturned. If 
labour is the basis of value, then value is equally the 
basis of labour.’21 The specific form of patent law’s 
separation between inventor and patentee points to 
the roots of patent value in the separation of labour 
and capital within the scientific credit economy, as 
well as giving rise to it by extending the circulation 
of scientific credits to other economic spheres. This 
spillover effect from law into the economy is sketched 
out below. 
Patents as fiat currency of credence
What is common to Latour and Woolgar’s as well 
as Bourdieu’s accounts of the scientific economy of 
credit is that the community of scientists has nor-
mally determined the value of scientific credit itself.22 
Regardless of the question of whether the system of 
such scientific credits works well or not, it evolved 
as a reciprocal system of trust and accountability 
based on the accumulation or loss of reputation and 
recognition, with the consequences of diminished 
resources and lack of information output.23 Such a 
reciprocal scientific credit economy loses its evalua-
tive monopoly when there is a separate accreditation 
system of credibility in place, such as patents. The 
scientific community retains its relevance as the 
arbiter of scientific truth value; however, patents are 
now also regarded as a currency of scientific credit, 
as witnessed by the category of patents in scientists’ 
CVs. The monopoly of twenty years that a patent 
affords has the effect of truncating knowledge pro-
duction into a different temporal horizon: decisions 
on how much investment one can risk fall differently 
if one thinks that a patent can help to recoup the 
expenses. The patent right acts as a temporal bracket 
in which the unencumbered property right in the 
form of a monopoly can be exploited. Ultimately, 
it affords different calculations of investment and 
return. This has the effect of enlarging the scientific 
economy of credit to other kinds and forms of credits 
beyond the traditional evaluation and accumulation 
of credit for securing academic funding, grants and 
career progression.
Most significantly, such a credit afforded through 
patents enables strategic and financial interests and 
expectations to be formed around the property right. 
First of all, a patent right collates the non-monetary 
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credits of science into property claims about the 
invention that can be sold, bought, exchanged. That 
would be the main characterization of patents as 
commodifications of knowledge. However, what is 
perhaps even more interesting than the fact of com-
moditization is the way in which patents as legal 
forms attach some kind of economic credibility to 
scientific credit. Scientific credibility and financial 
creditability become closely enjoined. Much of 
the value of patents lies in their ability to signal a 
certain propriety of the scientific product, to circu-
late scientific credit for commercial exchange, and 
to signal creditworthiness in order to raise more 
capital, especially in industries such as biotechnology, 
where the product development time is lengthy, often 
exceeding ten years, and in which patent applica-
tions and patents are seen as crucial requirements 
for investors, especially in the early funding rounds.24 
This accords with Latour and Woolgar’s point about 
the circular aim of scientific credit: that is, the ability 
to accrue more capital to maximize and accelerate 
more knowledge circulation. Patents, in this mode of 
value, function as signs of credit. 
An interview with an entrepreneur who was also a 
medical doctor and who had just obtained a patent on 
her/his biotechnological diagnostic device confirmed 
this analysis: ‘In our industry, if you want to raise 
more money in order to get to be able to reach the 
production stage, a patent is an essential stamp of 
approval or a quality badge in order to show investors, 
those of less sophisticated kinds, that you are a cred-
ible company to invest more money in.’25 The more 
sophisticated investors will still appreciate a patent 
as a non-monetary security, a kind of collateral, and 
ultimately as a potential to increase the return on 
their investment,26 but ‘they will assess the strength 
of your patent protection on the basis of what they 
know about your competitors and other venture 
capitalists’ investments.’ Interestingly, s/he said that 
even though the product may need more strengthen-
ing with subsequent patents, the initial patent will 
establish his/her company in the market and estab-
lish a better bargaining position when negotiating 
with competitors and manufacturers of components 
necessary for the end product to take off. In this light, 
even patents that are of low quality or credibility 
can act as ‘trump cards’ or ‘wild options’ in licensing 
negotiations with producers and competitors. 
The legal accreditation of scientific credits thus 
influences the ease with which the increasingly 
common figure of scientist-entrepreneurs can raise 
further funds.27 Individual patents in this sense 
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resemble a fiat currency. The belief in their value 
enacts their value. Processes of intellectual and 
financial capital accumulation are connected to 
investments, which would in other circumstances 
normally carry risk warnings: ‘The value of an invest-
ment and any income from it may fall as well as 
rise and is not guaranteed. You may get back less 
than you invest.’ ‘Past performance is not a guide to 
future performance.’ The legal veneer of credibility 
makes investments and involvement with patented 
inventions less speculative. Equally, good scientific 
credentials count for much in the radically uncertain 
environment of venture capital. In such an entan-
glement, the initial scientific credit of recognition 
becomes so closely enmeshed with the legal reward of 
proprietary rights that both recognition and reward 
become hard to distinguish from one another in the 
hybrid legal–scientific–financial circulation of invest-
ment and return. Edelmann proposed two theses 
about copyright law in the context of cinematic 
works, which also applies to the effects of patent law 
in relation to the scientific economies of credit: ‘first, 
the law fixes and assures the realization as a natural 
given of the sphere of circulation, and second, in the 
same moment it makes production possible. The law 
lives off its contradiction.’28 Patents appear as natural 
properties as well as conscious legal creations, which 
drive and continue the circulation and accumula-
tion of further scientific, legal and monetary credits. 
They act as currencies of scientific credit held for the 
purpose of attracting more investment for a policy, 
fulfilling signalling and credential functions, as well 
as representing collateral assets to secure financing. 
Patents as financial assets and securities
Although individual patents might be best under-
stood as speculative, singular credence goods or as 
currencies operating in an economy of singularities, 
not dissimilar to the definition of a singular com-
modity as advanced by Lucien Karpik,29 patents now 
also often come in bundles. Patents are traded, accu-
mulated, purchased and sold not only individually, 
but as portfolios. 
According to my interviewee, who was a licence 
negotiator for a very large medical diagnostic 
company, companies with strong patent portfolios 
often decide to ‘give away’ their proprietary right by 
not enforcing it in anticipation of future value accu-
mulation through inventions which smaller compa-
nies may later come up with and which may be useful 
to them. In other words, patent values are measured 
as the calculation of a return on investment expected 
in the future, and aggregation of patents is seen as a 
more valuable whole than the mere sum of its parts. 
The value of patent portfolios is also reflected in 
various financial entities and companies which do not 
pursue single patents but accumulate them or acquire 
them as a bundle. There are various forms of what are 
colloquially called ‘patent trolls’, or more technically 
Non-Practising Entities, which acquire patents for 
inventions that they have not invented. Perhaps the 
rise of Non-Practising Entities is the logical extension 
of the separation between inventorship and owner-
ship in patent law. It is worth noting that, despite the 
widespread uniform condemnation they receive as 
enemies of innovation, they have varying strategies 
of involvement in the actual businesses. The range 
is broad, from Non-Practising Entities purchasing 
patents only in order to litigate or settle and extract 
licence payments, to more hands-on companies that 
aggregate different businesses and companies, all 
of which are based on either purchased patents or 
exclusive licences of promising technologies. One has 
to be careful not to ascribe too much value to litiga-
tion: when litigation is taken as a measure of patent 
value, there are significant variations in litigation 
rates and patterns across different industries, with 
contradictory findings in the area of biotechnology 
and pharmaceuticals. Patent values are also very 
much dependent on the maturity of a technology.30 
However, another study of litigation patterns also 
seems to indicate that the financially most valuable 
patents are the most litigated. These are likely to be 
software and telecommunication patents the value 
of which are signalled in advance of the litigation, 
different from the patent values which crystallize in 
the process of litigation.31 The salient finding of the 
study is that these are disproportionately held in the 
hands of Non-Practising Entities. How is patent value 
constituted in such a constellation when original 
patent value is centred on an already existing market 
– for example, the mobile phone market – but further 
mined through third-party ownership and aggressive 
litigation strategy?
Non-Practising Entities are not normal business 
operations in the sense of growing the businesses 
and expanding research activities on the basis of their 
patent monopolies. Rather, their aim is to pursue 
profit by either licences or outright sale of the busi-
ness. The core of these business models is patents, 
because patents provide the investment security that 
the technologies around which the business is built 
will be relatively protected for a certain period of 
time. What becomes clear in such a business model 
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is that the actual contents of individual patents and 
their potential are only relevant as long as the patents 
are well networked; that is, if they are relevant to 
many scientific, technological, machinic processes 
and possess many points of contact to other research 
activities. The value of patents is, then, not neces-
sarily their inventive potential or usefulness, but the 
scale and reach of their connectivity. Connectivity, in 
turn, could be valued, for example, by a patent’s web 
of licences or technological interdependency among 
different actors.
In light of the increasing accumulation of patents 
as portfolios by Non-Practising Entities, the legal 
academic Michael Risch suggests thinking of patents 
as securities.32 Offering both a description of current 
developments in intellectual asset management and 
a business prescription (arguing that patent aggre-
gation is beneficial for an efficient market), Risch’s 
analysis conceives patents as even more fully discon-
nected and disembodied from their inventive object 
and originary scientific labour. It is arguably in this 
sense that patents act most immaterially as curren-
cies in the capitalist economy of intellectual credit 
circulation. This deserves closer scrutiny.
Securities are defined broadly in the US Securities 
Act of 1933 as 
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, 
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certifi-
cate of interest or participation in any profit-shar-
ing agreement, … investment contract, … fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral 
rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege 
on any security, … or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the foregoing. 
The same definition of security is applied regard-
less of the object of property rights, be it land or 
patent portfolios. In the United States, courts use the 
Howey test as the generally accepted starting point 
to determine whether an arrangement constitutes 
the sale of a security and thereby defines whether 
something is a security or not.33 In Howey, investors 
had bought an interest in land which was connected 
to a contract that envisaged the cultivation of oranges 
on the land. The contract entailed a recognition that 
the investors were entitled to a part of the profits 
which would result from the sale of oranges. The 
US Supreme Court held that this was an investment 
contract within the 1933 Act: 
The respondent companies are offering something 
more than fee simple interests in land, some-
thing different from a farm or orchard coupled 
with management services. They are offering an 
opportunity to contribute money and to share 
in the profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise 
managed and partly owned by respondents.34 
As Risch points out, the Court identified the 
factors that define such a contract: (1) an invest-
ment of money with the expectation of profit, (2) 
in a common enterprise, (3) coming solely from the 
efforts of a promoter or third party. Hence ‘the statu-
tory plan is apparently designed to regulate interests 
which secure capital for a venture, from investors, in 
exchange for a “piece of the action”’, as a former Secu-
rities and Exchange commission attorney explained.35 
But perhaps Risch crystallizes the speculative essence 
of security best in this observation: ‘The essence 
of security is any investment in a forward-looking 
venture in which the profit comes from the work of 
others.’36
In light of Howey, when thinking about the 
meaning of patents as securities there is another 
important step in the transformation from the status 
of a patent as a property or as a currency into a 
security. One is the recognition that being granted a 
patent does not in itself create a security; patents are 
turned into securities only when third-party capital 
interests are attached to it, such as investments in 
relation to a venture. This results in a paradox: the 
creation of security causes fundamental insecurity 
to property as identity, as traditionally understood 
in Hegel or Marx. I understand property here both 
as a legal form creating rights and obligations, and 
as referring to the object of property rights, which 
might be tangible or intangible. Security, according to 
the legal definition, only exists when future expecta-
tions in a property are created, but also they must 
be unrelated to the property. These expectations are 
different from interests arising from labour or pos-
session. This twin bind of security/insecurity is most 
acutely expressed in the US Supreme Court’s state-
ment: ‘If [the investment contract] test be satisfied, it 
is immaterial whether the enterprise is speculative or 
non-speculative or whether there is a sale of property 
with or without intrinsic value.’37 For a security to 
exist, it is irrelevant whether patents may incorporate 
intrinsic values, such as the usefulness of the actual 
invention over which a patent right was granted, the 
level of inventiveness, the process of an invention’s 
material making, or the different kinds of labour 
invested in the invention. Patented inventions, in 
their transformation into speculative securities, have 
ultimately become decoupled from their material 
embodiments and property interests. 
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Entangled credits
In the preceding analysis, I have tried to explain 
patent value as an entangled interplay of different 
modes of credit operating at different levels simulta-
neously. These adjacent articulations of patent value 
do not proceed in a linear temporal fashion, but 
rather operate concurrently across different knowl-
edge industries in a striated way. Although the endur-
ing patent-law narrative of reward and incentives 
for inventive labour might indicate otherwise, it is 
the increasing securitization of patents as financial 
assets which is the most interesting and disconcert-
ing development in the progressing abstraction of 
patentable knowledge into speculative futures and 
option. 
The performativity of patents as economic units 
of analysis meant that I needed to take economic 
scholarship seriously as an important site in which 
patent value has become articulated and stabilized 
by methods of quantification. Despite my theoretical 
divergence from the economic and dominant legal 
scholarship on patents, it was interesting to observe 
its mode of thinking and its focus on certain issues 
and not others. What is clear, however, is that the 
mainstream economic and legal analyses of patents 
and other forms of intellectual property do not 
address the broader interrelations and linkages 
between legal discourse, the scientific economy and 
the financial market, which would be well worth 
understanding better if immaterial knowledge is 
indeed driving the ‘knowledge economy’. Among 
many intellectual property scholars, there seems to 
be a belief that the invisible hand also steers the 
market of intangibles, provided law is designed in a 
balanced way.
Amidst this entangled and complicated portrayal 
of the multilayered credit economies underlying 
patent value, I wonder what it is that drives the 
value in this process. Capital? Knowledge? Future – of 
what? Latour and Woolgar have argued that it is 
the internal logic of information as capital acting 
as driver. They conceived the value of information 
being determined by demand and supply. Scarcity 
would increase the value of knowledge, analogical to 
pricing dynamics. Highly valued knowledge would 
produce more knowledge by attracting more funds, 
more connections, which are also valued, and so on. 
This portrayal seems to correspond to Lazzarato’s 
description of the production process of social com-
munication, in which ‘the process of the production 
of communication tends to become immediately the 
process of valorization’.38 However, for Lazzarato, it is 
immaterial labour, superseding the division between 
material and intellectual labour in the Bakhtinian 
sense, which fuels the capitalist knowledge economy. 
Differently, Edelman observed about the nature of 
French copyrights in the film industry that ‘[t]he law 
will state what we would never have hoped it could 
state – the true creative subject is capital.’39 Without 
denying the continued existence of non-monetary 
economic relations in sciences and the role of imma-
terial labour in the creation of economic value and 
social relations, to a certain extent, I believe that 
Edelman’s statement applies most appositely to con-
temporary patent law’s accreditation of the patent 
holder at the expense of the scientific labourer and 
the intellectual quests of sciences. The true creative 
subject of patent law seems to be credit, with its 
double connotation of recognition and indebtedness, 
as well as with a view to its future value as speculative 
surplus to be reinvested and circulated. Patents as 
legal forms of e/valuations enact, but also contain, 
the coalescence of inherent scientific and financial 
uncertainties within a property right. The effect 
by which the scientific author-inventor and her/his 
labour become eclipsed by the investor-patentee (who 
provides the capital for the often waged or financed 
work to be carried out in the first place) is already 
inherent in patent law’s epistemological foundations 
embodying different notions of credit as reward and 
recognition. Paradoxically credit and credibility do 
not only delimit future potentialities by reference to 
the past, but simultaneously enact more speculative 
futures by patents’ increasing transformation from 
property into security.
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